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I. Introduction
2010 witnessed continuing trends in U.S. export control and economic sanctions law
and policy as well as steps toward a more consolidated and streamlined regulatory regime.
Compliance expectations, the mandated use of outside auditors, penalty levels, and the
criminal prosecution of corporations and individuals for alleged violations increased. Iran
remained the paramount target of U.S. sanctions efforts, though enforcement of the other
sanctions programs proceeded at pace. In hopes of isolating the Ahmadinejad regime and
hindering Iran's refined petroleum capacity, Congress enacted legislation penalizing cer-
tain non-U.S. investments involving Iran. In parallel, multilateral sanctions targeting
Iran's financial system demonstrated the power of collective action. Our trading partners
such as Canada and the European Union implemented and enforced their own trade con-
trols in ways that increasingly resemble the U.S. system albeit in less cumbersome fashion.
Attempting to balance U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives against the
calls for efficiency and a positive balance of trade, the Obama Administration launched a
bold initiative to reform the U.S. export controls and economic sanctions regulatory, li-
censing, and enforcement bureaucracy by targeting our key risks and protecting our criti-
cal assets. Whether this initiative will result in genuine reform remains to be seen.
H. Export Reform Initiative
On August 13, 2009, the White House announced a comprehensive interagency review
of U.S. export controls, followed by Presidential Study Directive 8 of December 21, 2009,
directing the Administration to recommend reforms to the U.S. export control system.
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The Administration laid out four major reform initiatives: a single export control list, a
single licensing agency, a single enforcement agency, and a single information technology
("IT") platform. These "Four Singles" were described in an April 20, 2010 speech by
Defense Secretary Robert Gates and again by National Security Advisor James Jones on
June 30, 2010. President Obama announced progress at the U.S. Department of Com-
merce Bureau of Industry and Commerce ("BIS")' Update on August 30, 2010 relating to:
1. Interagency agreement on criteria for creating tiered positive lists of U.S. Muni-
tions List ("USML")2 and Commerce Control List ("CCL")3 items,
2. Agreement on the same set of licensing policies for both State and Commerce con-
trolled items, adding clarity and consistency to current International Traffic in
Arms Regulations ("ITAR")4 and Export Administration Regulations ("EAR")s
controls,
3. An Executive Order to create an Export Coordination Enforcement Center, and
4. Continuing to develop a single IT system.
A. Ttim FoUR SINGLES
1. Single Control List
The interagency working group sought to develop independent, objective criteria for
evaluating controlled technologies and restructuring the USML and CCL into a single,
three-tiered, positive list.
* Tier 1: Strictly controlled "crown jewel" technologies available almost solely in the
United States, relate to weapons of mass destruction, or confer a critical military or
intelligence advantage.
* Tier 2: Sensitive items available almost solely from members of multilateral export
control regimes.
* Tier 3: Broadly available items that confer some military or intelligence advantage,
or are otherwise prudent to control, such as for crime control or foreign policy
reasons.
No tiering criteria or bright-line test for determining whether an item is on the USML
has yet been announced.
To prevent decontrolled items from defaulting to EAR99, the combined list will likely
have "holding" Export Commodity Control Numbers (ECCNs) in lower tiers for those
items not within existing ECCNs. Unless the delegation of authorities under the Arms
Export Control Act can be amended administratively, the single control list might require
legislation because the USML is mandated by statute.6
1. U.S. Di.'Tr OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF INDUs. & SEC., http://www.bis.doc.gov (last visited Jan. 28,
2010).
2. 22 C.F.R. § 121 (2011).
3. 15 C.F.R. § 774 (2011).
4. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-30 (2011).
5. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-74 (2011).
6. Arms Export Control Act, §§ 2751-2799aa-2 (2010).
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2. Single Licensing Agency
Perhaps most controversial is the creation of a single licensing agency ("SLA") to pro-
cess export licenses now administered by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Indus-
try and Security ("BIS"), the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
("DDTC"), and the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC"), with participation by the Department of Defense and other agencies. Nuclear
controls administered by the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission
are not expected to become part of the SLA.
A SLA would provide a one-stop shop for export licensing and classification issues.
Concerns have been raised about locating the SLA in one of the existing export control
agencies, or within Homeland Security. The Administration has suggested creating an
independent agency led by a board of directors representing the numerous administrative
stakeholders. The SLA would report to the President, who would appoint the head of the
agency, with advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.
Creation of a SLA would require congressional agreement in an area where Congress is
traditionally resistant. Some harmonization of agency licensing practices, however, could
be implemented through administrative action.
3. Single Enforcement Agency ("SEA")
Overlapping jurisdiction in export controls enforcement is also perceived as inefficient.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), the Defense Criminal Investigative Ser-
vice, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the FBI have authority to investigate viola-
tions of all types of export controls. BIS, DDTC, and OFAC also have jurisdiction to
impose administrative (non-criminal) penalties for violations of their own regulations.
The single agency reportedly would have authority only over criminal matters (much like
the current system), so the goals of this effort need more explanation. Currently, only
BIS's Office of Export Enforcement reviews license applications, so this would be an in-
creased role for enforcement. The SEA will also have a single policy on voluntary disclo-
sures and penalty mitigation.
Full implementation of the SEA could require legislation. The Administration issued
an Executive Order on Nov. 9, 2010 establishing an "Export Enforcement Coordination
Center" within the Department of Homeland Security, staffed by representatives from the
export enforcement agencies and intelligence community.7 This order will, essentially,
formalize existing coordination practices.
4. Single IT Platform
The Administration has proposed a single IT platform to support efficiency and consis-
tency in licensing and enforcement. The single IT platform would allow the various
agencies to access and query the system, minimizing inconsistent determinations and en-
hancing tracking ability. It would also provide a single point of entry for the exporting
community. Development of a single IT platform parallels the development of a single
export license application.
7. Exec. Order No. 13,558, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,573 (Nov. 9, 2010).
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B. PHASEDm IMPLEMENTFATION
The Administration announced a three-phase implementation. Phases I and II are de-
voted to policy and regulatory changes that can be accomplished through administrative
actions. Phase III contemplates legislative changes.
* Phase I: (i) Improve the export controls system and complete work on the earliest
two reforms announced in 2009; (ii) rule changes on encryption (EAR) and dual
nationals (ITAR); (iii) establish criteria for tiered controls; (iv) streamline and har-
monize interagency license processes; (v) create a unified IT platform; and (vi) es-
tablish an integrated enforcement center.
* Phase II: (i) Complete two positive, mirrored and tiered CCL and USML lists; (ii)
harmonize export agency administrative practices; (iii) adopt common definitions
between the ITAR and EAR; (iv) complete IT migration for license review; (v) har-
monize enforcement practices and fully implement the Export Enforcement Coor-
dination Center; and (vi) identify items to remove from control lists that require
congressional notification and/or proposals to multilateral export regimes.
* Phase III: Implement the "Four Singles."
C. PARALLEL LEGISLATIVE EFFOwrs
Interagency efforts on export reform proceeded in conjunction with separate efforts by
the House Foreign Affairs Committee to draft a bill to amend the Export Administration
Act,8 which lapsed over a decade ago.
[. Dual-Use Export Controls
A. RULE CHANGES
1. Encryption
AJune 25, 2010 interim final rule eliminated product-by-product classification require-
ments for most 5D992 mass market and 5D002 ENC-Unrestricted ("ENC-U") items, as
well as biennial export reporting for most ENC-U products. 9 The new system institutes a
one-time registration requirement for companies producing encryption items, plus an an-
nual report of encryption changes to products during the prior year.
The rule also implements the December 2009 Wassenaar Arrangement agreed-upon
Note 4 to CCL Category 5, Part 2, which decontrols items that do not use encryption for
the principal purpose of computing, communications, networking, or information security
purposes, and where the cryptographic functions are limited to the specific functions of
the item. This builds upon the relaxation of prior review requirements on so-called "an-
8. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (Sept. 29, 1979).
9. Encryption Export Controls: Revision of License Exception ENC & Mass Market Eligibility, Submis-
sion Procedures, Reporting Requirements, License Application Requirements, and Addition of Note 4 to
Category 5, Part 2, 75 Fed. Reg. 36,481 (une 25, 2010) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 730, 734, 738, 740,
742, 748, 772, and 774).
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cillary" encryption items implemented in 2008.10 The rule also revised performance pa-
rameters for 5D002 ENC-Restricted items and liberalized License Exception ENC
eligibility for encryption source code and technology.
2. Foreign Direct Product Rule
On July 30, 2010, BIS expanded the scope of the so-called "Direct Product Rule" to
encompass reexports to embargoed countries not previously covered." Under the Direct
Product Rule, certain foreign made items are subject to the EAR and require a license or
license exception for export because they are the direct products of national-security con-
trolled U.S.-origin technology or software.12 The Direct Product Rule previously applied
only to foreign made items reexported to Country Group D:1 countries or Cuba. The
rule expanded the country scope to cover all of Country Group E: 1, adding Iran, Sudan,
and Syria and made conforming revisions to License Exception TSR and licensing
guidance.
3. Commerce Control List
BIS made several rounds of changes to the Commerce Control List ("CCL"), the most
important of which are:
a. Third Phase of Comprehensive CCL Review
BIS implemented the third and final phase of its comprehensive CCL review, which
began in 2007.13 Revisions include: (i) clarifications to existing controls; (ii) elimination
of redundant or outdated controls; and (iii) establishment of more focused and rational-
ized controls. This rule affected numerous ECCNs in Categories 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9. Addi-
tional changes were made to the de minimis rules relating to "hot sections" of jet engines
and certain encryption items as well as to License Exception APP for computers in EAR
740.7. The rule also removed Regional Stability (RS2) controls for Austria, Finland, Ire-
land, Sweden, and Switzerland.
b. Missile Technology Control Regime
BIS implemented changes made to the Missile Technology Control Regime ("MTCR")
Annex agreed to at the 2009 Plenary.14 The rule clarified the meaning of "production
facilities" and made changes to ECCNs IC101, IC111, 1C117, and 9A101.
10. Encryption Simplification, 73 Fed. Reg. 57,495 (Oct. 3, 2008) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 732, 734,
738, 740, 742, 744, 746, 748, 750, 762, 770, 772, and 774).
11. Foreign Direct Products of U.S. Technology, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,887 (uly 30, 2010) (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. pts. 732, 736, 740, and 748).
12. 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(a)(4) (2011); 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(3) (2011).
13. Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations Based Upon a Systematic Review of the Com-
merce Control List: Additional Changes, 75 Fed. Reg. 36,511 (une 28, 2010) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts.
734, 738, 740, 742, 772, and 774).
14. Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations Based on the 2009 Missile Technology Control
Regime Plenary Agreements, 75 Fed. Reg. 20,520 (Apr. 20, 2010) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 772 and
774).
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c. 2008 and 2009 Wassenaar Arrangement Changes
BIS implemented changes made to the Wassenaar Arrangement's List of Dual Use
Goods and Technologies at the 2008 Plenary15 and 2009 Plenary.16 The rules affected
ECCNs in all CCL categories and added unilateral U.S. export controls on some items
decontrolled by Wassenaar Arrangement revisions.
d. New and Proposed Controls for Homeland Security Items
BIS implemented the first set of changes identified by an interagency working group
reviewing homeland security-related export controls, adding ECCNs to control certain
concealed object detection equipment and related software and technology.17 BIS also
proposed new controls on infrasound sensors used to detect earthquakes, volcanic erup-
tions, rocket launches, and nuclear explosions. 8
e. Clarification of Crime Control License Requirements
BIS updated and clarified controls on certain striking weapons, restraint devices, shot-
guns, optical sighting devices, electric shock devices, and human execution equipment.19
4. Jurisdictional Scope of Commodity Classification Determinations and Advisory Opinions
By interim final rule, BIS clarified that exporters may not treat BIS-issued commodity
classifications or advisory opinions as determinations that an item is "subject to the EAR,"
and not subject to the jurisdiction of another agency. 20 The rule is intended to prevent
exporters from circumventing the commodity jurisdiction process by relying on a BIS
commodity classification as an implicit ruling that an item is not subject to the ITAR.
5. Elimination of Hard-Copy Documents and Revisions to Recordkeeping Requirements
BIS eliminated paper versions of most licenses, notices of denial, return without action
notices, classification determinations, License Exception AGR notification results and en-
15. Wassenaar Arrangement 2008 Plenary Agreements Implementation: Categories 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Parts I and
II, 6, 7, 8 & 9 of the Commerce Control List, Definitions, Reports, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,000 (Dec. 11, 2009) (to
be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 740, 742, 743, 772, and 774).
16. Wassenaar Arrangement 2009 Plenary Agreements Implementation: Categories 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Part 1, 6, 7,
and 9 of the Commerce Control List, Definitions, Reports, 75 Fed. Reg. 54,271 (Sept. 7, 2010) (to be codi-
fied at 15 C.F.R. pts. 734, 742, 743, 744, 772, and 774).
17. Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations to Enhance U.S. Homeland Security: Addition of
Three Export Control Classification Number (ECCNs) and License Review Policy, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,335
(Mar. 25, 2010) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 740, 742, 748, and 774).
18. Addition of New Export Control Classification No. 6A981 Passive Infrasound Sensors to the Com-
merce Control List of the Exp. Admin. Regulations, and Related Amendments, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,742 (June 29,
2010) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 742 and 774).
19. Revisions to the Commerce Control List to Update and Clarify Crime Control License Requirements,
75 Fed. Reg. 41,078 (uly 15, 2010) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 742 and 774).
20. The Jurisdictional Scope of Commodity Classification Determinations and Advisory Opinions Issued
by the Bureau of Industry and Security, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,052 (Aug. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts.
734 and 748).
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cryption review requests, and made related changes to EAR recordkeeping
requirements. 21
B. SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT CASES
BalliAviation Ltd. On May 11, 2010, Balli Aviation Ltd., a subsidiary of the U.K.-based
Balli Group PLC, was sentenced to a $2 million criminal fine and corporate probation for
five years for conspiracy to export three Boeing 747 aircraft to Iran. On February 4, 2010,
Balli Group and Balli Aviation entered a civil settlement with BIS and OFAC, which in-
cludes a civil penalty of $15,000,000-the largest civil penalty imposed under the EAR, of
which $2,000,000 is suspended pending no further export control violations. In addition,
a five-year suspended denial of export privileges was imposed on both Balli entities.
Under the terms of the settlement, Balli Group and Balli Aviation are required to submit
to BIS and OFAC the results of independent annual export compliance audits for the next
five years. 22
Chitron Electronics, Inc. Chitron and two Chinese nationals (one a U.S. resident), were
convicted May 17, 2010 of conspiring to violate U.S. export laws and illegally exporting
items from the United States to China, including to military end-users. A Chitron man-
ager was also convicted of making false statements on export control documents. The
exported electronic equipment is used in electronic warfare, military radar, fire control,
military guidance and control equipment, and satellite communications, including global
positioning systems. 23 On July 22, 2010 the manager was sentenced to eleven months
imprisonment (time served), three years of supervised release, and a modest fine. The
corporation and the other two individuals are to be sentenced in November of 2010.24
Y-Lan Chen. Yi-Lan Chen, a/k/a "Kevin Chen," a Taiwanese national, was sentenced on
August 27, 2010, to forty-two months in prison on charges of conspiring to illegally ex-
port dual-use commodities to Iran. Chen's corporation and co-defendant, Landstar Tech
Company Limited, a Taiwan corporation, was sentenced to one year of probation. The
conviction relates to an undercover enforcement operation, where Chen attempted to de-
liver hermetic connectors and glass-to-metal seals to Taiwan for ultimate delivery to
Iran.25
21. Issuance of Electronic Documents and Related Recordkeeping Requirements, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,052
(Apr. 5, 2010) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 740, 748, 750, and 762).
22. Don't Let This Happen To You: An Introduction to U.S. Export Control Law, U.S. BUREAU OF INDUS. &
SEC., 10 (2010), http://www.bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforcement/donletthishappentoyoul2010.pdf.
23. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Two Chinese Nationals Convicted of Illegally Exporting Electronic
Components Used in Military Radar and Electronic Warfare (May 17, 2010), available at http://www.bis.doc.
gov/news/2010/doj05172010.htm.
24. Don't Let This Happen To You: An Introduction to U.S. Erport Control Law, supra note 22, at 16.
25. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Taiwan Exporter is Sentenced to Three and A Half Years for Con-
spiring to Export Missile Components from the U.S. to Iran (Aug. 30, 2010), available at http://www.bis.doc.
gov/news/2010/doj08302010.htn.
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IV. Defense Export Controls
A. RULE CHANGES
Departing from past practice, the State Department solicited formal comments on pro-
posed ITAR changes through Federal Register notices instead of issuing final rules without
comment.
1. Proposed Exemption for Foreign Licensee Dual National and Third-Country National
Employees
Attempting to resolve a long-simmering foreign policy irritant with U.S. allies, DDTC
published a proposed rule regarding dual-national and third-country national ("DTCN")
employees of foreign recipients of licensed exports. 26 Third-country nationals are nation-
als of countries different from the recipient's nationality. The exemption attempts to ad-
dress the collision of DDTC's requirement that DTCN employees of a foreign recipient
be specifically identified and licensed with the human rights and privacy laws of U.S.
allies.
The proposed exemption would permit release of defense articles and technical data to
DTCNs directly employed by a foreign recipient. Authorization is conditioned on the
foreign recipient implementing procedures to prevent unauthorized diversion, such as re-
quiring foreign government security clearance or establishing a screening procedure for
employees to determine whether they have "substantive contacts" with restricted or pro-
hibited countries (e.g., China, Sudan, Cuba, etc.), such as travel, contact with agents or
nationals of such countries, allegiance to such countries, or acts otherwise indicating a risk
of diversion.
2. Draft Brokering Rule
On November 25, 2009, DDTC issued a draft proposed rule to amend the ITAR Part
129 brokering regulations. 27 The draft expands the definitions of "broker" and "broker-
ing activities," and removes the precondition of acting "as an agent for others" in return
for a "fee, commission, or other consideration." 28 Under the new definition, brokering
would include: (1) financing, transporting, or freight forwarding; (2) soliciting, promot-
ing, negotiating, contracting for, or arranging a purchase, sale transfer, loan, or lease; (3)
acting as a finder of potential suppliers or purchasers; or (4) taking any other action to
assist a transaction involving a defense article or defense service. The proposed rule
would expand requirements for prior approval of brokering activities and reporting, and
require foreign brokers to register with DDTC and obtain authorization relating to the
brokering of reexports of defense articles, even if such reexports were authorized by an
existing license.
26. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Dual National and Third-Country Na-
tional Employed by End-Users, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,625 (Aug. 11, 2010) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pts. 124 and
126).
27. Amendments to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Registration &7 Licensing of Brokers, Brokering
Activities, Related Provisions, and Other Technical Changes, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.
pmddtc.state.gov/DTAG/documents/Partl29BrokeringComments.pdf.
28. Id. at 4, 6.
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3. Clarification to Technical Data Exemption
DDTC amended ITAR 125.4(b)(9) to confirm it applies to technical data "regardless of
media or format" and to technical data "taken" out of the United States. 29 The rule con-
firms that the exemption is available for hand-carry exports of ITAR technical data on
laptops or portable digital media.
4. Elimination of Pre-Approval Requirement for Proposals
DDTC eliminated ITAR 126.8, which required prior approval or notification with re-
spect to certain proposals to foreign persons relating to sales of significant military equip-
ment ("SME"), given the increased efficiency of electronic licensing.30
5. Proposed Modification to Foreign Military Sales/U.S. Government Program Exemption
DDTC issued a proposed rule to amend ITAR 126.6, placing more responsibility on
the Dept. of Defense (DOD) to monitor use of the Foreign Military Sales ("FMS") ex-
emption.31 The proposed changes would impose additional administrative burdens (pri-
marily on DOD), update eligible modes of transportation, and extend the exemption to
cover DOD sales, grants, leases, or loans of defense articles to assist building the capacity
of foreign military forces for specified purposes.
B. DDTC POLICIES
In addition to publishing proposed ITAR changes for formal comment, DDTC has
increased posting of notices and formal guidance on its website.
1. Name, Address, or Registration Code Changes
DDTC began using the General Correspondence ("CGC") process to approve U.S. and
foreign entity name, address, and registration code changes for licenses and agreements. 32
Changes may be approved for multiple licenses and authorizations, no longer requiring
each document to be amended.
29. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Export Exemption for Technical Data, 75
Fed. Reg. 52,625 (Aug. 27, 2010) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 125).
30. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Removing Requirement for Prior Ap-
proval for Certain Proposals to Foreign Persons Relating to Significant Military Equipment, 75 Fed. Reg.
52,622 (Aug. 27, 2010).
31. Amendment to the International Arms Traffic in Arms Regulations: U.S. Government Transfer Pro-
grams and Foreign-Owned Military Aircraft and Naval Vessels, 74 Fed. Reg. 61,586 (Nov. 25, 2009) (to be
codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 6).
32. U.S. Dep't of State Directorate of Defense Trade, General Correspondence for Amendment of Eristing
ITAR Authorzations Due to U.S. Entity Name/Address and/or Registration Code Changes, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE
(May 8, 2010), http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/licensing/documents/glGCsUS.pdf; U.S. Dep't of State Direc-
torate of Defense Trade, General Correspondence for Amendment ofEristing ITAR Authorizations Due to Foreign
Entity Name/Address Change, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (May 8, 2010), http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/licensing/
documents/glGCsForeign.pdf.
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2. Unauthorized Imports
On November 25, 2009, DDTC issued a website notice about a U.S. person's obliga-
tions when it receives "a defense article for repair or replacement without" prior notice
and without an indication that a temporary import license or exemption has been used. 33
The U.S. person is advised to investigate and determine if it has any responsibility for the
violation. If not, the U.S. person may apply to return the item in lieu of submitting a
voluntary disclosure.
3. Request for License Proviso Reconsideration/Clarification
DDTC issued guidance regarding requests for proviso reconsideration or clarification.
For DSP licenses, such requests now may be submitted as a (1) "General Correspondence
(GC) request," or (2) a "replacement DSP authorization."34
C. ELECTRONIC SuMiSssIoNS AND ACCESS TO DDTC
DDTC now requires that all proposed agreements and Commodity Jurisdiction ("CJ")
requests be submitted to DDTC electronically. 35 The MARY Status Retrieval System
became available online as of March 8, 2010.36
The D-Trade 2 System uses a DSP-5 license application form as the "vehicle" for sub-
mitting agreements and amendments.37 All post-approval documents must be uploaded to
D-Trade 2. An applicant may no longer amend previously approved hard-copy agree-
ments, but must first submit electronically a "re-baselined" agreement.38 DDTC guide-
lines have been modified accordingly.39
Use of electronic Form DS-4076 is now mandatory for commodity jurisdiction ("CJ")
requests and USML category determinations. DDTC prefers that the manufacturer file
such requests, and other parties must submit a letter of authorization from the
manufacturer.4o
33. U.S. Dep't of State Directorate of Defense Trade, Temporary Import Violations, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/licensing/documents/WebNoticeTemporarylmportViolations.pdf (last visited
Jan. 29, 2010).
34. U.S. Dep't of State Directorate of Defense Trade, Requests for Proviso Reconsideration and/or Clarification,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, (July 19, 2010), http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/licensing/documents/gLproviso.pdf.
35. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Commodity Jurisdiction, 75 Fed. Reg.
46,843 (Aug. 4, 2010) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 120).
36. MARY [Status Retrieval System] provides Industry Users a quick and convenient way to access their
DTrade 2 export license statuses. See U.S. Dep't of State Directorate of Defense Trade, Industry Notice 03/04/
2010: Full Version of Mary Status Retrieval System Going Live, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Mar. 4, 2010), http://
www.pmddtc.state.gov/documents/Industry%2ONotice_20100305.pdf.
37. U.S. Dep't of State Directorate of Defense Trade, Guidelines for Preparing Electronic Agreements, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/licensing/docunents/agreement-Electronic
Guidelines.pdf.
3 8. Id.
39. U.S. Dep't of State Directorate of Defense Trade, Guidelines for Preparing Electronic Agreements
(Revision 2.0) (Apr. 1, 2010), U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/licensing/documents/
agreement-ElectronicGuidelines.pdf.
40. U.S. Dep't of State Directorate of Defense Trade, C7 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
(Sept. 2009), http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/faqs/documents/FAQCJ.pdf (FAQ No. 4).
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Although electronic submission is a positive step, the DS-4076 form has limitations.
Key fields are character-limited, and an applicant usually will need to attach supporting
documents, such as more detailed CJ analysis. Additionally, the form requests informa-
tion about previous exports. DDTC indicates in the instructions that a disclosure of unli-
censed exports on Form DS-4076 does not qualify as a "voluntary disclosure" in
accordance with ITAR § 127.12. Thus, exporters seeking CJ determinations for previ-
ously exported items may need to file initial voluntary disclosures, contemporaneous with
the CJ request or contingent on the outcome of CJ review.
D. ENFORCEMENT
Xe Services LLC (formerly known as Blackwater Worldwide) "entered into a consent
agreement to settle 288 violations of the AECA and ITAR in connection with the unau-
thorized export of defense articles" (including technical data), provision of defense services
(military training to foreign forces), violating license provisos, "sales activity involving a
proscribed country," failure to maintain required records, as well as false statements and
omissions.4' Some $42 million in civil penalties were imposed, following 31 disclosures to
DDTC-16 directed disclosures and 15 voluntary disclosures. 42
AAR International, Inc. "entered into a consent agreement to settle [thirteen] violations
of the AECA and ITAR in connection with the unauthorized export of defense articles by
Presidential Airways, Inc. and its affiliates Aviation Worldwide Services, LLC; Air Quest,
Inc.; STI Aviation, Inc.; and EP Aviation, LLC."13 These former Blackwater-affiliated
companies were purchased by AAR International, Inc.44 No civil penalties were levied,
but significant changes to compliance systems for AAR International and its affiliates were
exacted by DDTC, including enhancing written compliance procedures, conducting in-
ternal audits, engaging outside auditors, and submitting the results to DDTC.
Interturbine Aviation Logistics GmbH "entered into a consent agreement to settle
[seven] violations of the AECA and ITAR in connection with unauthorized exports of
defense articles." 45 In a complex settlement, a total of $1,000,000 million in penalties was
imposed, although $900,000 of the penalty was suspended. 46 Engaging an outside auditor
41. U.S. Dep't of State Directorate of Defense Trade, Consent Agreements, 2010: Xe Services LLC, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/consent_agreements/XeServices
LLC.html.
42. U.S. Dep't of State Directorate of Defense Trade, Xe Services LLC Consent Agreement, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, 15, 21-22 (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/consent-agreements/pdf/Xe-
ConsentAgreement.pdf.
43. U.S. Dep't of State Directorate of Defense Trade, Consent Agreements, 2010: AAR International, Inc.,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, (July 26, 2010), http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/consent-agreements/AAR
Intemational.html.
44. Andrew J. Shapiro, Lifting of Policy of Denial Regarding Activities of Presidential Airways, Inc. and Its Sub-
sidiaries/Affiliates Regulated Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), FED. REG., July 2 3, 2010,
hittp://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2010/07/23/2010-18109/bureau-of-political-military-affairs-lifting-
of-policy-of-denial-regarding-activities-of.
45. U.S. Dep't of State Directorate of Defense Trade, Consent Agreements, 2010: Interturbine Aviation Logis-
tics GmbH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/consentagree-
mentsa/InterturbineAviation.html.
46. U.S. Dep't of State Directorate of Defense Trade, Interturbine Aviation Logistics GmbH Consent Agree-
ment, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 3-4 (an. 4, 2010), http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/consent-agree-
ments/pdfflAL..ConsentAgreement.pdf.
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to prepare an audit report for submission to DDTC was one of the conditions of the
suspension. $400,000 of the suspended penalty must be applied to compliance program
enhancements in the event that Interturbine seeks to restore its DDTC registration. 47
V. Economic Sanctions
During 2010, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Department of
the Treasury focused its efforts on strengthening and streamlining a number of its existing
programs, while continuing to expand the reach of its more targeted programs against
specific individuals, activities, and companies.
A. BELARUS, IRAQ, LEBANON, NORTH KoRm, AND SoMAuA
In 2010, OFAC issued several new, but separate, sets of sanctions regulations48 to syn-
thesize the existing combination of executive orders, licenses, and other documentation
that previously comprised much of its sanctions programs regarding Belarus, Iraq, Leba-
non, North Korea, and Somalia. These new regulations did not significantly change the
overall structure or effect of these sanctions regimes.
Nevertheless, these new regulations adopt certain attributes found only in OFAC's
more recent asset freezing and blocking regimes. 49 Under these newer programs, OFAC
generally blocks property and interests in property of a person, and identifies the person
as a Specially Designated National during the pendency of an investigation. Avoiding
some of the ambiguity of earlier asset freezing and blocking programs, these newer sanc-
tions expressly state that, if a blocked party holds, "directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or
greater interest" in another entity, then all property or any interests in property held by
that entity are blocked (regardless of whether that entity has been specifically identified by
OFAC for blocking purposes). Further, some recent sanctions regulations do not provide
exemptions previously common to many 'sanctions regulations for personal communica-
tions, informational materials, and travel.50
B. CUBA
On March 9, 2010, OFAC announced that it would amend the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations to clarify that, in connection with licensed sales of agricultural items during
2010, "the term 'payment of cash in advance' shall mean payment before the transfer of
47. Id. at 6.
48. See Belarus Sanctions Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 5,502 (Feb. 3, 2010) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt.
548); see also Iraq Stabilization and Insurgency Sanctions Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 55,463 (Sept. 13, 2010) (to
be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 576); Lebanon Sanctions Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,907 (July 30, 2010) (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 549); North Korea Sanctions Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 67,912 (Nov. 4, 2010) (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 510).
49. See, e.g., Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 544 (2011).
50. The new North Korea Sanctions Regulations and the Somalia Sanctions Regulations do not exempt
specific types of informational transactions. These sanctions are not entirely predicated upon the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which requires exemptions for certain informational
materials. See North Korea Sanctions Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 67,912.
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title to, and control of, the exported items to the Cuban purchaser."5 In addition, OFAC
updated its list of authorized providers of air, travel, and remittance forwarding services
for Cuba eight times during 2010.52
C. IRAN
The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010
("CISADA") was signed into law onJuly 1, 2010.s3 CISADA expanded the Iran Sanctions
Act of 1996 (the "ISA"), which gives the President the authority to penalize companies
involved in Iran's energy sector or in certain other activities disfavored under the ISA.54
CISADA also provided for the imposition of certification requirements for federal con-
tractors, authorized U.S. state and local governments to divest their assets from entities
that invest in Iran's energy sector, and required new banking regulations.
Under the amended ISA, penalties are available for any person that the President deter-
mines has: (i) invested $20 million or more in any 12-month period knowing it would
directly and significantly contribute to the development of Iranian petroleum resources;
(ii) exported goods, services or technology to Iran knowing that they would materially
contribute to Iran's ability to acquire or develop chemical, nuclear, or biological weapons
or advanced conventional weapons; (iii) sold, leased, or otherwise provided to Iran goods,
services, technology, information, or support with a value of $1 million, or $5 million over
a 12-month period, that could directly or significantly facilitate the maintenance or expan-
sion of Iran's domestic production of refined petroleum products; (iv) exported or pro-
vided to Iran refined petroleum products or goods, services, information, technology, or
support with a value of $1 million, or $5 million over a 12 -month period, that could
directly and significantly contribute to Iran's ability to import refined petroleum
products.ss
The penalties that may be assessed against any person determined to have engaged in
any of the disfavored activities include: (i) a prohibition of transactions in foreign ex-
change; (ii) a prohibition of transfers of credit or payments by, through or to any U.S.
financial institution that "involve any interest of the sanctioned person;" (iii) a prohibition
on the acquisition, transfer, import, export, or other use of any U.S. property "with re-
spect to which the sanctioned person has any interest;" (iv) denial of assistance from the
U.S. Export-Import Bank; (v) denial of licenses to export from the United States; (vi)
denial of loans or credits from any U.S. financial institution exceeding $10 million in one
year; (vii) denial of Federal Reserve primary dealer status or denial of U.S. government
funds repository status for financial institutions; (viii) denial of participation in federal
51. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,996 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt.
515) (emphasis added) (issued pursuant to pursuant to § 619 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2010).
52. Office of Foreign Assests Control, 2010 OFAC Recent Actions, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-EnforcementPages/ofac-actions-2010.aspx (last visited
Feb. 4, 2011).
53. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195
(2010) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701).
54. Pub. L. 104-172 (1996) (as amended, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701).
55. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195
(2010) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701).
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contracting; and (ix) denial of the ability to import goods and services into the United
States.56
On October 1, 2010, the U.S. State Department imposed penalties under the ISA, for
the first time in the history of the statute, against Naftiran Intertrade Company
("NICO"), a Swiss subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company ("NIOC").5 7 Later in
October, under a "special rule" in the ISA, the President declined to penalize Total, ENI,
Royal Dutch Shell, and Statoil because they pledged to end their business in Iran.5
In addition, OFAC issued guidance on August 12, 2010,s9 then amended the Iranian
Transactions Regulations on September 28, 2010,60 to implement import and export
prohibitions of section 103 of CISADA and terminate two general licenses that previously
had authorized imports into the United States of, and dealings and services related to,
certain foodstuffs and carpets of Iranian origin. Furthermore, the Iranian Transactions
Regulations were amended on June 18, 2010, to permit OFAC to expand the list of enti-
ties deemed to be "the Government of Iran" to include non-financial entities owned or
controlled by Iran.61
In August 2010, OFAC issued a new set of regulations, the Iranian Financial Sanctions
Regulations,62 as required under CISADA. The regulations impose restrictions on U.S.
"financial institutions"63 that provide correspondent banking services to any non-U.S. fi-
nancial institutions that may be designated for engaging in certain activities disfavored
under the ISA. Financial institutions may be designated for knowingly engaging in: (i)
facilitating the Iranian government's efforts to "acquire or develop weapons of mass de-
struction" or support terrorism; (ii) facilitating "the activities of a person subject to finan-
cial sanctions" under any Iran sanctions resolution of the UN Security Council; (iii)
engaging in money laundering or facilitating transactions by Iranian financial institutions
related to (i) or (ii); or (iv) providing significant financial services to the Iranian Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps or its agents or affiliates, or certain blocked Iranian financial
institutions.64
CISADA also requires the Treasury Department to issue regulations (without specifying
a deadline) that may impose certain additional Iran sanctions-related compliance obliga-
tions on financial institutions that provide correspondent banking services from the
United States for non-U.S. financial institutions. 65
56. See id.
57. See 75 Fed. Reg. 62,916 (Oct. 13, 2010).
58. See James B. Steinberg, Briefing on Iran Sanctions Act Implementation, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Sept. 30,
2010, http://www.state.gov/s/d/2010/148479.htm.
59. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Guidance Regarding Import Prohibitions Imposed by the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, (Aug. 12, 2010).
60. Iranian Transactions Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 59,611 (Sept. 28, 2010) (to be codified by revoking 31
C.F.R. §§ 560.534-35).
61. Iranian Transactions Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,630 (June 18, 2010) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt.
560).
62. 75 Fed. Reg. 49,836 (Aug. 16, 2010) (codified in scattered sections of 31 C.F.R. pt. 561).
63. 31 C.F.R. § 561.309 (2011) (defining U.S. financial institutions).
64. 31 C.F.R. § 561.201(a) (2011).
65. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195,
§ 104(e) (2010).
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D. PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS-CUBA, IRAN, AND SUDAN
On March 8, 2010, OFAC issued general licenses authorizing the export to Cuba, 66
Iran, and Sudan of certain free, publicly available software for personal communication
over the Internet (such as instant messaging, email, and social networking), a well as ser-
vices incidental to the export. 67
E. SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS
OFAC frequently updated the Specially Designated National List under a variety of
programs in 2010. Most designations in 2010 were directed toward Global Narcotics
Traffickers.
F. SUDAN
On October 20, 2010, OFAC published a Statement of Licensing Policy establishing a
favorable licensing regime for the commercial exportation or reexportation of U.S.-origin
agricultural equipment and services to all areas of Sudan (in addition to those areas previ-
ously exempted as "Specified Areas"). The Statement of Licensing Policy indicated that
OFAC generally would apply the same criteria it uses for agricultural licensing under the
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000.68
G. TERRORISM
On November 23, 2009, OFAC amended the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations,
imposing blocking requirements against persons who provide certain financial, material,
or technological support for terrorist activities.69 Together with a list of examples, these
amendments clarified that the provision of financial, material or technological support of
terrorism can include the provision of any tangible or intangible property used for that
purpose. Also, OFAC released its annual report in March 2010 on the effectiveness of its
asset blocking programs in combating international terrorism.70
66. The export or reexport to Cuba of items "subject to the EAR" also must be authorized by the U.S.
Department of Commerce. Cuban Assets Control Regulations; Sudanese Sanctions Regulations.
67. Cuban Assets Control Regulations; Sudanese Sanctions Regulations; Iranian Transactions Regulations,
75 Fed. Reg. 10,997 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 515, 538, and 560), available at http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/Documents/soc net.pdf.
68. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Statement ofLicensing Policy Regarding Agricultural Exports to Sudan,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, (Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanc-
tions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/sudanlicenseag.pdf.
69. Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 74 Fed. Reg. 61,036, (Nov. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. pt. 594), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/fr74-61036.pdf
70. See Office of Foreign Assets Control, Terrorist assets Report: Eighteenth Annual Report to Congress on Assets
in the US. of Terrorist Countries and International Terwrirm Program Designees, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAsURY,
(2009), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/tar2009.pdf.
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H. OTHER ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
1. Aviation Services International, B.V
Aviation Services International, B.V., also known as Delta Logistics, B.V. (collectively,
"ASI") settled administrative charges filed by OFAC and BIS arising from ASI's alleged
unlicensed export of aircraft parts and other goods to Iran during 2005-2007.71 ASI
agreed to a $100,000 criminal penalty, and accepted a BIS Export Denial Order prohibit-
ing it from exporting any goods from the United States for seven years. 72
2. Innospec, Inc.
Innospec agreed to pay $2.2 million to settle allegations of violations of the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations.73 OFAC's settlement is part of a $40.2 million comprehen-
sive criminal and civil settlement between Innospec and OFAC, the DOJ, the SEC, and
the United Kingdom's Serious Fraud Office. OFAC alleged that Innospec maintained a
sales office in Cuba and conducted business in Cuba, with Cuban power companies, and
with financial institutions located in Cuba. Innospec voluntarily disclosed the matter to
OFAC.
3. Hilton International Co.
Hilton remitted $735,407 to settle alleged violations of the Sudanese Sanctions Regula-
tions. 74 Hilton voluntarily disclosed to OFAC the alleged violations, relating to the unau-
thorized operation of two Hilton-brand hotels in Sudan.
4. Royal Bank of Scotland N.V. /ABNAMRO Bank N.V
In May 2010, the Royal Bank of Scotland N.V. (the renamed ABN AMRO Bank N.V.)
agreed to forfeit $500 million and to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement with the
DOJ to settle criminal economic sanctions and anti-money laundering charges related to
the alleged "stripping" of the details of Iranian and other targeted parties in processing
international U.S. dollar funds transfers.75
71. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Enforcement Information for March 9, 2010, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREA-
SURY, (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/
03092010.pdf.
72. A $750,000 OFAC civil penalty was deemed satisfied by ASI's agreement to pay the criminal fine and
acceptance of the BIS penalties. Id.
73. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Enforcement Information for March 19, 2010, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Docu-
ments/03192010.pdf.
74. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Enforcement Information for April 23, 2010, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREA-
SURY, (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/
04232010.pdf.
75. Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Just., Former ABN Amro Bank N.V. Agrees to
Forfeit $500 Million in Connection with Conspiracy to Defraud the United States and with Violation of the
Bank Secrecy Act (May 10, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/May/10-crm-548.hml.
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5. Agar Corporation
In June 2010, Agar Corporation Inc. pled guilty to criminal charges and entered into a
settlement with OFAC of civil charges related to indirect exports of goods and services
and facilitation of exports to Sudan. 76 Agar agreed to pay a criminal fine of $760,000, the
forfeiture of $380,000, and a civil penalty of $860,000, for a total of $2 million in penal-
ties. Agar also agreed to implement an expanded sanctions compliance program and to
appoint an independent export control auditor.
6. Maersk Line, Limited
Maersk Line, Limited, and its subsidiaries Farrell Lines Incorporated and E-Ships, Inc.
(collectively, "MLL") remitted $3,088,400 to settle alleged violations of the Sudanese
Sanctions Regulations and the Iranian Transactions Regulations."7 OFAC alleged that
MLL provided unlicensed shipping services for 4,714 shipments of cargo originating in or
bound for Sudan and Iran.
7. Barclays Bank PLC
In August 2010, Barclays Bank PLC settled criminal and civil charges related to the
transfer of Iranian funds through the U.S. financial system, which it had voluntarily dis-
closed.78 Barclays agreed to forfeit $298 million as part of deferred prosecution agree-
ments reached with the DOJ and the New York County District Attorney's Office.79
Barclays entered into a settlement of civil charges brought by OFAC as well mandating an
expanded OFAC compliance program but paid no additional penalties. Barclays allegedly
caused its New York branch and other U.S. financial institutions to process transactions
for entities targeted by sanctions. According to these documents, they removed or falsi-
fied references to these entities in U.S. dollar payment messages to U.S. correspondent
banks.
I. SIGNMICANT COURT CASES INVOLVING OFAC PROGRAMS
The Ninth Circuit held that the government need not prove that a person charged with
violating the Iranian Transactions Regulations was aware of a specific licensing require-
ment but only that the defendants knew their actions violated the U.S. embargo.80
76. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Enforcement Information for July 15, 2010, U.S. DEPT OF THE TREA-
SURY, Guly 15, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/
07152010.pdf.
77. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Enforcement Information for July 28, 2010, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREA-
sURY, ouly 28, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/
07292010.pdf
78. Barclays Bank PLC Settles Allegations of Violations of Multiple Sanctions Programs, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, Aug. 18, 2010, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Docu-
ments/barclays08182010.pdf.
79. Id.
80. United States v. Mousavi, 604 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010).
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In The New York Times Company v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, the Southern District of
New York granted the Times' motion for summary judgment pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act to seek the identities of individuals granted an OFAC license.8'
VI. Canadian Developments
A. STATUTORY AMENDMENTS
On July 13, 2010, North Korea joined Myanmar and Belarus on Canada's Area Control
List,82 which requires an export permit under the Erport and Import Permits Act for any
exports of goods or technology.
There were several key developments regarding Canadian sanctions against Iran this
year. On June 18, 2010, amendments to the Iran Sanctions Regulations came into force
implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 into Canadian law.83 These in-
cluded measures in the uranium-mining sector, additions to the list of designated persons,
and export bans on certain goods and technology.
On July 22, 2010 following similar actions taken by the United States and the European
Union, Canada implemented its own sanctions against Iran, adding to the compliance
burden of Canadian companies doing business internationally, particularly in the financial
services and oil and gas sectors. The new measures, implemented under Canada's Special
Economic Measures Act (SEMA), include prohibitions against new investment in the Iranian
oil and gas sector, providing items used in refining oil and gas to Iran, establishing corre-
spondent banking relationships with Iranian financial institutions, and providing or ac-
quiring financial services to allow an Iranian financial institution to be established in
Canada or vice-versa.84 Canada also promulgated a relief provision in the Special Economic
Measures (Iran) Permit Authorization Order,85 which permits the Canadian Government to
grant special permission to export to Iran notwithstanding a prohibition under the SEMA.
The following General Export Permits and Regulations are under review: General Ex-
port Permit No. 1-Export of Goods for Special and Personal Use Permit; General Export
Permit No. 27-Nuclear-Related Dual Use Goods; General Export Permit No. 29-Eligi-
ble Industrial Goods; General Export Permit No. 30-Certain Industrial Goods to Eligible
Countries and Territories; and Transshipment Regulations.86
81. New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, No. 09 Civ. 10437 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2010).
82. Order Amending the Area Control List, SOR/2010-162 (Can.).
83. Regulations Amending the Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on Iran, SOR/
2010-154 (Can.).
84. Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations, SOR/2010-165 (Can.).
85. Special Economic Measures (Iran) Permit Authorization Order, SOR/2010-166 (Can.).
86. See Legislation, DEP'T OF FoREIGN AFF. AND INT'L TRADE (Can.), httpJ/www.international.gc.ca/con-
trols-controles/report-rapports/legislation-reglements.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
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B. CASES/CBSA ENFORCEMENT AcTIoNs
1. R. v. Yadegari
On July 6, 2010, Mahmoud Yadegari was found guilty on nine of ten charges in relation
to the attempted export of pressure transducers to Iran.8 7 The charges were laid under
the Customs Act,88 the United Nations Act,89 the Export and Import Permits Act
("EI!PA"),90 the Nuclear Safety and Control Act ("NSCA")91 and the Criminal Code.92
The pressure transducers ("manometers") convert pressure measurements into an elec-
trical signal that can be recorded or displayed. The devices have several benign industrial
applications but can also be used in uranium enrichment and are controlled under the
EIPA and the NSCA. Mr. Yadegari purchased ten transducers from Alpha Controls and
Instruments and then tried to export some of them via courier to Iran through Dubai.
On July 29, 2010, the Court sentenced Mr. Yadegari to 51 months imprisonment.93
The prosecution was seeking 6.5 years. The case sets an important precedent both in
terms of the substantive elements of the charges and the factors considered in sentencing
for export-related offenses.
2. Steven and Perinne de Jaray
On April 29, 2010, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) charged Steven and Per-
ienne de Jaray with exporting 5,100 controlled electronic chips to Hong Kong without a
permit and failing to report the export.
3. Kenn Borek Air
On November 10, 2010 in the first case of its kind involving Myanmar, the CBSA
charged Kenn Borek Air and its former general manager for exporting a de Havilland
DHC-6 Twin Otter airplane and 149 aircraft parts without valid export permits.94
C. ADMINISTRATIVE STEPS TowARDs LIBERALIzING ENCRYPTION CONTROLS
After launching consultations in response to business concerns about the competitive
impact of its encryption controls, the Export Controls Division of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Canada took some tentative steps towards establishing greater trans-
parency and flexibility in its implementation of these rules. These included publishing
87. See Yadegari Guilty, PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERV. OF CAN., July 6, 2010, http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/
eng/nws-nvs/comm/2010/06 07 10.html.
88. Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.) (Can.).
89. United Nations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. U-2 (Can.).
90. Export and Import Permits Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-19 (Can.).
91. Nuclear Safe and Control Act, S.C. 1997, c. 9 (Can.).
92. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (Can.).
93. Given certain reductions, the overall sentence is 35.5 months. The prosecution had sought 6.5 years.
Sentence in R. v. Yadegari, PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERV. OF CAN., July 6, 2010, http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/
eng/nws-nvs/comm/2010/29_07-10.html.
94. Charges Laid for Unlawfid Export of Goods to Myanmar, CAN. BORDER SERvs. AGENCY, Nov. 10, 2010,
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/medialprosecutions-poursuites/pra/2010-11-10-eng.html.
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guidelines on obtaining multi-destination permits or cryptographic goods, software, and
technology. 9s These permits enable exporters to ship or transfer items to consignees in
multiple countries under relatively flexible terms and conditions.
95. Permits for Ctyptographic Items, FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE CAN., Oct. 9, 2010, http://www.interna-
tional.g.ca/controls-controles/export-exportation/crypto/Broadbased-Elargie.aspx?lang=eng.
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